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Determining the trust of an individual Bitcoin wallet is a difficult prob-
lem. There are no ratings, that offer vendors or exchanges mean-
ingful information about the level of the taint of Bitcoins they are
receiving. Lack of such information places exchanges liable in an
event when the received Bitcoins are stolen or ill-gotten. In this pa-
per, we try to solve this problem by introducing a Bitcoin address
taint score called TaintRank. It provides insight into a specific wal-
let by taking the addresses it interacted with throughout history into
consideration. This ranking method provides such Bitcoin exchange
companies insight with whom they are trading.
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Cryptocurrencies have become a hot topic in the last coupleof years with their beginning being contributed to the Bit-
coin blockchain created in 2008. The project addressed issues
regarding money governance, and the issuing being controlled
by central authorities. It presented a novel solution to these
problems using decentralization, consensus protocols such as
Proof of Work and promises of privacy. These properties have
in the last couple of years attracted a large population of peo-
ple who saw the potential of such a payments’ system being
accepted worldwide. This created a need for new financial in-
stitutions called cryptocurrency exchanges. These institutions
specialized in cryptocurrencies while also providing a bridge to
the old system. Most of these institutions lacked the required
KYC/AML checks of users which allowed people partaking in
illicit activities such as selling drugs and human trafficking to
launder their Bitcoins into fiat currencies.
1. Motivation
Another consequence of the quick growth of interest in cryp-
tocurrencies and the lack of proper system security audits
were the many hacks of exchanges. The hacks dispossessed
them of hundreds of thousands of bitcoins. Because the Bit-
coin network offers pseudo-anonymity to its users, it prevents
any linking between addresses and any personally identifiable
information∗. Usually, when some bigger hacks happen on
popular cryptocurrency exchanges, there is nothing we can
do but wait until the thieves want to use their Bitcoins to
buy goods or exchange them. Frequently, users with tainted
Bitcoins use mixers to launder them. A mixer works so that
the tainted Bitcoins which are deposited, are put into reserve
whereas the clean Bitcoins are paid out to the customer on
a new address. Doing that, we lose the trace of the original
address as it can not be directly linked to the new one.
This alongside exchanges not verifying their users allows malev-
olent actors to get by unscathed. With the increasing regula-
tion on cryptocurrencies, financial institutions working with
such currencies will be required to do extensive due diligence.
∗This assumes that the user is versed in privacy and does not for example reuse addresses. It
also assumes the use of techniques such as CoinJoin to prevent addresses from being connected.
These techniques add additional overhead and are too advanced for the average Bitcoin user so
they received little to no traction
This will be mandatory not only of the involved parties but
also of the origin of the coins giving every deposit into their
system a risk score. This will raise the awareness about which
coins exchanges process to lower their exposure in case of, for
example receiving a subpoena from a legal entity investigating,
to return them - like credit card charge-backs.
In this paper, we propose a new method of determining the risk
factor of received coins from a specific address based on their
history and interactions with the network called TaintRank.
By having such information, vendors or exchanges can act
differently based on the TaintRank the depositing address has.
Using the TaintRank score, an exchange can require additional
verification or a store can refuse participate in the purchase.
Such a ranking system is not expected to be bulletproof, so
we should not make harsh actions solely based on TaintRank
score a certain address has.
2. Related work
The area of cryptocurrency network and transaction analysis
has received quite a lot of attention in recent years. Researchers
have done extensive research on the analysis of the level of
anonymity that the network provides (1) or with the use of
different third-party services called mixers or tumblers (2–4).
These services promise to obfuscate the real identities of the
owners by randomly exchanging the coins between different
users. Such services only disconnect addresses and make direct
connections impossible but in reality, they cannot launder the
coins in the true essence of the word: someone will always
receive marked coins and we can track them even through
such services.
There has been some research in risk analysis of the Bitcoin
network such as in Spagnuolo et al.(5) where they propose
a system capable of clustering different addresses, classifying
them based on the activity and providing insight into how they
interact with the network. Malovrh (6) investigates possibili-
ties of using supervised learning as a technique for detecting
different anomalies in the Bitcoin network which include crim-
inal activities. DebtRank, proposed by Battiston et al. (7),
evaluates financial institutions based on the institutions they
are loaning or debiting from. Meiklejohn et al. (8) deals with
understanding the traceability of Bitcoin flows. It gives us a
good estimation of how we expect stolen Bitcoins will move
and be spent or exchanged. It also touches on some limitations
of mixing services, which fail if we are dealing with multiple
thousand stolen Bitcoins.
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3. Methods
Methods we tested are based on node importance. We first
construct a directed network where each node represents a
Bitcoin address and each directed link a weighted transaction
between the two addresses. Each of the nodes in the network
receives its own TaintRank based on different parameters such
as node degree and edge weight. We use prior knowledge to de-
termine the tainted nodes. This knowledge included addresses
belonging to a thief who stole Bitcoins from an exchange.
Since the entire Bitcoin network is too large to handle, we use
some timeline after a specific event happened. In our case,
this was a theft of Bitcoins from an exchange. We took the
data for 1 month after the attack happened and determined
the TaintRank score for nodes in the network.
We test multiple different approaches to spread the taint
throughout the network. First, we test a method where each
node spreads its TaintRank by a fixed amount no matter the
link weight or other parameters. While we would lose track
of the specific address that used a mixer, the person behind
it will have an equal TaintRank score on their new addresses
afterwards. The negative side of this approach is, that even
if an address receives a tiny fraction of Bitcoin from a very
tainted address, it itself becomes equally tainted.
The further approaches we test take other parameters into
the equation. We use distance from the original thief node,
weight of the links, value of the node that is linking to us and
other parameters to determine TaintRank of the nodes. For
example, we did not give the same TaintRank score to each of
the outgoing transaction, but we set its size proportional to
the weight of the transaction. Doing that, we exclude some
nodes not involved in illegal activities but would be tainted
using the first method. But with this, less strict method, we
are also open to attacks, that could reduce the TaintRank
score of criminal addresses.
A. Hypothesis. The methods we test differ whether they give
out TaintRank proportional to the weight of the link or whether
they always give out the same amount no matter the weight.
In the first scenario, we are expecting to be vulnerable to a
kind of attack, that spreads Bitcoins into many small frac-
tions, and then ultimately joins some of them together to get
almost untainted Bitcoins in some new address. The second
approach would, taint each node that interacts with tainted
node (receives Bitcoin from) by a fixed amount. Because of
that, a criminal who knows how the approach works might
just send tiny fractions of Bitcoins to random addresses to
taint them, with the same amount he is tainted. Doing that,
many regular users will receive a high TaintRank, resulting in
more work for the companies trying to filter genuinely tainted
addresses. The perfect combination will most likely comprise
some combination of both approaches, taking many parame-
ters into consideration when deciding for the TaintRank score
of a node.
4. Selected data
Since its inception, the Bitcoin network has grown in size
exponentially. It has millions of addresses and hundreds of
millions of transaction. This scale poses a great challenge when
trying to analyze it. To make the problem more contained,
we select a subset of the network which proves to be a good
decision. We extract 285,591 transactions in a period between
20.06.2011 to 20.7.2011 which amasses to a network with
parameters that can be seen in table 1.
Table 1. Bitcoin network data for the period between 20.06.2011 to
20.7.2011 .
nodes links 〈k〉
505,473 1,143,444 4.524
The reason we chose this time frame was that
one of the bigger Bitcoin thefts happened while the
network was still small. This was the Mass MyBit-
coin Theft which happened between 20th and 21st of
June 2011. The theft is associated with the address
1MAazCWMydsQB5ynY XqSGQDjNQMN3HFmEu
which we use as our starting point. We extract the data
using a Bitcoin database index into a public Google BigQuery
database which allows us to search with ease for the data
using the well-known SQL query language. This removes a lot
of issues because we do not have to write a program which
fetches transactions from a full-history Bitcoin node which are
not public. Using a query in BigQuery we exported all the
inputs and the outputs of transactions for that given period.
This gives us 100MB JSON file which we further process into
a usable graph representation in the edgelist format using a
custom script written in Golang. After that, we use scripts
written in Python to analyze the graphs and try applying our
taint analysis methods. While processing the data we thought
of a heuristic approach which could reduce the size of the
overall network. The transactions on the Bitcoin network
are made up of different inputs which map to outputs of
earlier transactions. To spend an output in a new transaction
the owner of the output must provide his signature. Given
that a transaction contains inputs from multiple different
addresses and that the transaction can be signed only after it
was created, we believe it is safe to assume that the one who
constructed the transaction is also in control of all the private
keys used to sign the transaction. The counter-example to
this would be the CoinJoin (9) principle. This effectively
allows multiple disparate entities to include their unspent
outputs into a common transaction. But it also requires a
party to act as a synchronizer between all other parties. This
creates a high level of complexity which leads us to believe
that such principles are rarely used. Treating addresses of
inputs in a transaction as owned by a common entity allowed
us to reduce the size of our selected the network by almost a
half.
A. Degree distribution. Degree distribution in our network
could tell us a lot about the nodes. We can assume that
nodes with an extremely high degree (hubs) are some sort of
exchanges or perhaps mixers. For example, some nodes are
actually Bitcoin exchanges, and we should not spread Tain-
tRank to them since we assume that exchanges would check
the incoming addresses, and not accept funds from a (overly)
tainted node. Firstly, we plot the degree distribution for both
in and out degrees, which can be seen in figure 1.
As seen from the plot, both vaguely resemble a power-law
distribution. But considering the spike in the beginning of poutk
and some clearly visible spikes at node degree of 100 and 1000,
we should not conclude that the network follows a power-law
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Fig. 1. Degree distribution in the created network for both in and out degree.
degree distribution. For further examination, we look at five
addresses with the highest node degree as seen in table 2
Table 2. Top five Bitcoin addresses in our network that have the high-
est pink and p
out
k . In the last column there is the believed owner.
Address Degree Belongs to
pink
1eHhgW6vquBYhwMPhQ668HPjxTtpvZGPC 2,283 Mt.Gox
1PJnjo4n2Rt5jWTUrCRr4inK2XmFPXqFC7 1,776 Slush’s pool
1CxjYUcBFmBftskGFST9MXhyQMQUNTuBzi 1,239 Unknown
1MAazCWMydsQB5ynYXqSGQDjNQMN3HFmEu 627 MyBTC thief
1MbSn15MZWNbkNWF72KopyQenCV2zdcWvr 598 Unknown
poutk
1MaZAHzEFfinRJ2dwK6YtNDfvWMBkiAxDr 27,055 Unknown
18qr2srETSvQq4kP7yBYRqQ4LzmjhtRmcD 26,975 Unknown
1PJnjo4n2Rt5jWTUrCRr4inK2XmFPXqFC7 10,607 Slush’s pool
1AgwESN7RKNZtaqzbqu6kPg3RS6C2qCgHi 7,548 Unknown
1AZUPm5PC5QguquNsBg7HhWUYz5dfm2nU9 7,527 Unknown
We can see that the the highest out-degree is one magnitude
higher than the highest in-degree, which tells us that most
addresses spread the funds they are sending out to multiple
destinations. Based on the findings of these addresses, we
could adjust our algorithms, to take into account what some
of these nodes represent. But the issue is that most of the
addresses have an unknown owner.
5. Results
With the methods described in 3, we test our approach on
the network. In the selected data, we know the address where
the initial stolen funds went and we base our propagation on
it. Based on that, we start to propagate the taint throughout
the network by recursively following all the out links. The
number of nodes which could be reached following the out
links from the original address is extremely large (227,656),
indicating that the funds have most likely made contact with
an exchange of some sort. In the table 3, we can see the
characteristics of this subgraph. When comparing them to the
original graph we see that the average node degree is smaller,
but no fundamental differences.
Table 3. Subgraph network data for the period between 20.06.2011 to
20.7.2011 .
nodes links 〈k〉
227,656 379,738 3.336
Degree distribution of the subgraph can be seen in figure 2.
It seems to follow power-law degree distribution better than the
original graph. The in degree distribution is almost textbook
example of power-law, whereas out degree has some spikes
that could make us question it.
Fig. 2. Degree distribution in the subgraph created from the network for both in and
out degree.
To reach the last node starting from the tainted one, we
have to make 1660 steps. Based on this observation, we have
more than enough nodes, that require different TaintRank
scores, since we know they are not equally tainted. With this,
we hope to gain some insight into nodes that are truly tainted,
and make sure that nodes that are not really involved with the
thief do not get tainted (too much). In the next approaches,
we will be using this subgraph to calculate TaintRank of the
nodes.
A. Fixed TaintRank spread. First method we test consists of
applying the TaintRank of the original node to all its successors.
With this method, as predicted, the drawback was that now we
are dealing with almost half the nodes of the original network
(227,656) being equally tainted. Because of that, we can not
differ if some of the nodes are more tainted than the others.
The positive side is that we did not miss any node which
received tainted funds, but we also included lots of nodes that
should not be tainted.
B. Link weight and node value. In this method, we spread
TaintRank based on the current node value and the weight of
the out-link. With this approach, we try to take into account
the amount of tainted funds that are being sent and how
tainted is the address, which is sending us these funds. We
start in the root node and calculate TaintRank for each node
in an iterative fashion using the following equation where Vj
is the value (sum of all in-links) of node j, Γi represents the
in-neighborhood of node i and w(i, j) represents the weight of
the edge connecting i and j.
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ti =
∑
j∈Γi
tj × w(j, i)
Vj
Similarly we tested the approach, where we consider Vj
as the sum of all out-links instead of in-links. Reasoning
behind it is, that we look only at the funds we are spreading
instead of the total funds we are have received. Following the
equation, each node received TaintRank from every one of its
predecessors, based on the amount received via this link and
the value of the predecessor node. Results of both approaches
can be seen in figure 3. As we can see, the approach where we
calculated the values from out-links gives a higher TaintRank,
since we are only considering spent(sent) funds. The initial
drop is also less drastic than the one with in-links. With this
method, we should consider as tainted roughly first 100 nodes,
right until the lines start to have linear pace.
Fig. 3. Using link weight and node value to determine TaintRank. Displayed are top
1000 highest TaintRank scores for both approaches at determining the value of the
node. Y-axis is logarithmic for better separation.
The benefits of this approach are that not all nodes get
tainted equally but rather proportional to the amount received.
Negatives include a dropping TaintRank as we split the stolen
funds into lots of smaller pieces and spend them separately.
C. Distance from the original tainted node. In this method we
want to take into account distance a certain address has from
the root (thief) node. At start, we set the TaintRank of root
node to one and then set the TaintRank for other reachable
nodes using iterative fashion. In the equation we are iterating
over all in-links of the currently visited node i and calculating
ti based on their TaintRank and distance of node i from the
root node:
ti =
∑
j∈Γi
tj
distance(i, root)
The results for the top 1000 highest TaintRank scores can be
seen in figure 4. The top 1000 nodes are not necessarily equal
to the ones found in previous method. With this method, we
can capture when a thief is splitting Bitcoins into tiny fractions,
but does not make much distance from the original address.
We can see that the curve looks stair-like, where each step
represents that we are further from the root node. Considering
the closeness, we could say that first 100-200 nodes gained
relatively large TaintRank and should be considered, whereas
the further ones matter less.
Fig. 4. Using distance to determine TaintRank. Displayed are top 1000 highest
TaintRank scores.
Our reasoning for this method was, the further you would
be from the tainted node, the less tainted you would get. Of
course this kind of spreading leaves us vulnerable when a thief
intentionally makes a long chain before spending the stolen
Bitcoins.
D. Combined approach. With the above, we have seen the
shortcomings of each approach. In order to make it harder for
the thief to shake off the taintedness, we try combining both
approaches. Combined approach method calculates tainted-
ness of a node based on both methods. The equation becomes
as follows:
ti =
∑
j∈Γi
tj
distance(i,root) +
tj×w(j,i)
Vj
2
Of course, because we used both methods, we have to divide
final result by two. We have also tried applying max value
from both approaches instead of average between the two, but
it produced similar results (around 400 nodes, that would be
considered). In figure 5 we can see the differences between
the previous approaches and the final, combined one. On the
chart, we can see that the amount of considerably tainted
nodes is biggest with the combined approach (around 400
nodes would be considered as tainted). Reason behind it is
that it can handle edge cases, where a specific method would
fail. An example of such edge case, where the weight method
would fail is when the thief would spread Bitcoins into tiny
fractions across different addresses. Each would then have
a small TaintRank value. Vice versa can be observed in the
distance method, where the thief could make a very long chain
of transactions and TaintRank would drop independent of the
weight of links. With this approach, we deal with such cases,
where one method fails but the other succeeds. As with all
such problems, even this approach would fail in an event where
the thief knows how TaintRank is being calculated and would
act to trick it.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of different approaches at calculating TaintRank. Displayed are
top 1000 nodes based on highest TaintRank.
E. PageRank like propagation. For this method we define our
taint propagation similarly to how PageRank works. First
let’s define mi as all in-edges for node ni, m′i as all tainted
in-edges for node ni, and ki and k′i as the number tainted and
all out-edges for node ni.
We define an initial taint value for every node in the network
based on the ratio of total tainted in-edges and all in-edges
of a node. Labeling of whether an edge is tainted was done
during the data preparation phase.
ti =
m′i
mi
To calculate the actual taint value we use a formula which
calculates a nodes taint based on the taints of the neighbour
nodes Γi with whom node ni has an in-edge
ti =
∑
e∈Γi
te
k′e
This measure spreads the taint of a node over all its tainted
out edges. The distinction of why we use only the tainted out
edges is because the node might have legitimate transactions
which happened before the ones which moved tainted funds.
Such a measure not only marks nodes dealing with a high
number of tainted transactions but also propagates this high
taint on the nodes that received them.
We applied this method on the two instances of both the
clustered and non-clustered networks. We also changed the
number of times we recalculate the taint on a network by orders
of magnitude. A single iteration takes six seconds on a higher
range laptop running an eight core i7 processor and 16 GB of
RAM. We use a script written in Python to calculate the ranks.
E.1. Taint distributions.We run the method on a non-clustered
and clustered graph with one and five iterations. After calcu-
lating the values, we plot the taint distributions of these graphs.
Figures 6 and 7 represent the distributions for non-clustered
graph, while 8 and 9 represent the clustered graph. What
we can observe from these figures is that with the increase of
iterations, the taint distribution seems to resemble power-law
distribution. Such a distribution is the most expressed with
the clustered five iterations graph taint distribution.
The reason for such a distribution is difficult for us to reason
about and it requires further investigation. It might be a
coincidence, based on the data sample we worked on or it
might have some to us unknown underlying mechanics.
E.2. Nodes with the highest taint rank.We select the best five
nodes for every iteration count according to their taint rank.
We then try searching for these addresses on the internet to
try and reason on why they have such high ranks. This is
easy for the non-clustered graph because every node is its
own address. But with the clustered graph this proves to be a
challenge. Not only do we have to check all the addresses in a
cluster, but also because we have to reason why the clustering
method works.
The top node with the highest taint rank
in non-clustered graph with one iteration is
1eHhgW6vquBY hwMPhQ668HPjxTtpvZGPC. After
performing search on the internet, we believe address belongs
to an exchange. Search on the internet lead us to believe
that the address is connected to an exchange called Mt. Gox.
Other four addresses seem to be burner addresses with high
amounts of incoming and outgoing bitcoins. They could
potentially be used by one of the mixing services.
Searching for the top nodes with the highest taint rank in
non-clustered graph with five iterations gave us no information
about the addresses’ main purpose. The top address from the
single iteration result was not on the list anymore while the
other four addresses moved up a spot. A new address took
the fifth place. Most of the addresses again look like burner
addresses. To determine whether this is correct, we’ll have to
find a way to classify them.
Fig. 6. PageRank like propagation for non-clustered with one iteration
6. Discussion
We’ve developed five different methods and all of them give at
least slightly different results. This makes the evaluation even
more difficult. Knowing whether a specific method’s results are
relevant, without understanding the underlying socioeconomic
mechanics, makes this problem even more difficult to tackle.
Results provided by the approaches make a lot of sense. Since
we were calculating TaintRank on 45 % nodes of the entire
network, they must not be all highely tainted - the vast ma-
jority should be very mildly tainted. This was achieved using
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Fig. 7. PageRank like propagation for non-clustered with five iterations
Fig. 8. PageRank like propagation for clustered with one iteration
Fig. 9. PageRank like propagation for cluster with five iterations
all of the approaches. We have seen the pros and cons of each
and tried some combinations of them. Entire computations
are computationally very efficient with time complexity for the
first four iterative approaches of O(n). The assigned scores
give us some insight on what nodes we would like to avoid as a
Bitcoin exchange company or a merchant. If we would process
these ill-gotten Bitcoins as an exchange company or vendor
we might face some liabilities. Potentially we would have to
refund the person that was hacked and deal with the loss
ourselves. Such company could also be treated as a suspect
in the theft. As stated before, we should not solely rely on
this rank, but it can be a first step we take. Potential use case
for the TaintRank system would be performing such scores in
real time. After an exchange got hacked, they would pinpoint
the original hacker node and TaintRank would be calculated
for the future nodes, preventing others from accepting funds
from tainted addresses. Same could be applied to some nodes,
that are known to participate in illicit activities. In a perfect
scenario, we could rely solely on the most basic method we
tested. Giving each node that is reachable from the thief node
a TaintRank of one and assume complete knowledge from all
traders - so legitimate people would not accept funds from the
tainted person. But this is not feasible, so other approaches
we tested would probably be applied.
7. Conclusion
Analyzing the Bitcoin network is a big challenge just by itself.
The ever-expanding nature makes it very difficult to process
the whole network fast enough for it to stay relevant with
every new block. With the increasing popularity the number
of unique addresses and transactions between them grow expo-
nentially. But given enough resources and sufficiently powerful
processing infrastructure, this isn’t something we couldn’t
solve. The bigger issue is the social, non-technical aspect of
the network. The questions of how to validate the results of
developed methods. Different methods return different results
and comparing them without any prior knowledge is next to
impossible. We believe that the methods we developed are a
great step in the right direction. They show us that a taint
score can be calculated for addresses. Given enough context,
it can prove to be useful in determining whether an address
is trustworthy. But we also believe that these methods are
far from being applicable in real world scenarios where the
livelihood of a crypto-currency exchange is at stake.
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